

James Pryor: Curriculum Vitae

NYU Dept of Philosophy
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Employment

(As Regular Faculty)

NYU Dept of Philosophy

Hired with Tenure
Associate Professor 2005–2013
Professor 2013–

Princeton University Dept of Philosophy

Hired with Tenure
Associate Professor 2002–2005

Harvard University Dept of Philosophy

Instructor 1996–1997
Assistant Professor 1997–2002
Offered Tenure

(As Visiting Instructor or Researcher)

North American Summer School on Logic, Language, and Information (NASSLLI)

Taught a week-long course with Chris Barker on “Functional Programming Techniques for Philosophy and Linguistics,” at Rutgers, July 2016

<http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/nasslli/>

NYU Abu Dhabi

Taught an undergraduate Epistemology course, Spring 2016

Institute for Advanced Studies, Hebrew University

Visiting Researcher, September 2011–February 2012

École Normale Supérieure

Taught a compressed graduate Epistemology seminar, May 2009

Seoul National University

Co-taught a compressed graduate seminar with Scott Sturgeon and Jason Stanley, June–July 2007

University of Barcelona

Taught a compressed graduate Epistemology seminar, March–April 2005

Brown University

Taught a two-day graduate Epistemology seminar, March 2005

Education**Princeton University**

PhD in Philosophy 1997

Cornell University

BA in Philosophy, summa cum laude 1991

Areas of Specialization

Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Areas of Competence

Philosophical Logic, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Action Theory, History of Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy, British Empiricism

Publications**“Merits of Incoherence”**

With commentary by Ori Beck, Anil Gupta, Adrian Haddock, Declan Smithies, and my replies

Forthcoming in a volume of *Analytic Philosophy* together with other contributions to the October 2016 Pittsburgh Conference on Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason

“De Jure Codesignation”

In *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language*, 2nd edition, edited by Bob Hale, Alex Miller, and Crispin Wright (Blackwell, 2017)

“Mental Graphs”

In *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 7 (2016), special volume edited by François Recanati and Michael Murez

“Problems for Credulism”

In *Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism*, edited by Chris Tucker (OUP, 2013)

“When Warrant Transmits”

In *Wittgenstein, Epistemology and Mind: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright*, edited by Annalisa Coliva (OUP, 2012)

“What’s Wrong with McKinsey-style Reasoning?”

In *Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology*, edited by Sanford Goldberg (OUP, 2007)

“Reasons and That-Clauses”

In *Philosophical Issues* 17 (2007)

“Hyper-Reliability and Apriority”

In *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 106 (2006)

See also **“More on Hyper-Reliability and Apriority”** at

<http://www.jimpryor.net/research/papers/More-Hyper.pdf>

“Bad Intensions” (co-authored with Alex Byrne)

In *The Two-Dimensional Framework*, edited by Manuel García-Carpintero and Josep Macià (OUP, 2006)

“What’s So Bad about Living in the Matrix?”

Published online in 2003 at whatisthematrix.warnerbros.com (site now inactive, text available at <http://www.jimpryor.net/research/papers/matrix/plain.html>)

Also in *Philosophers Explore the Matrix*, edited by Christopher Grau (OUP, 2005)

“There Is Immediate Justification”

In *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, edited by Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (Blackwell, 2005)

Reprinted in 2nd edition (2013), edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, with a further [exchange with Juan Comesaña](#)

“What’s Wrong with Moore’s Argument?”

In *Philosophical Issues* 14 (2004)

Comments on Sosa’s “Relevant Alternatives, Contextualism Included”

In *Philosophical Studies* 119 (2004)

“Highlights of Recent Epistemology”

In *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 52 (2001)

“The Skeptic and the Dogmatist”

In *Nous* 34 (2000)

Reprinted in *The Philosopher’s Annual* 23 (2001)

“Immunity to Error through Misidentification”

In *Philosophical Topics* 26 (1999)

Presentations at Colloquia, Workshops, and Conferences

“De Jure Codesignation”

NYU Mind and Language Seminar, January 2018

“Updating as Jeffrey or Dempster-Shafer with Undermining”

Workshop on Experience and Updating, Bochum, July 2017

“The Merits of Incoherence”

Workshop on Perception and Justified Belief, Bochum, June 2017

“The Merits of Incoherence”

Workshop on Knowledge Beyond Natural Science, Stirling, May 2017

“Problems for Credulism”

NYU Mind and Language Seminar, January 2017

“The Merits of Incoherence”

Conference on Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason, Pittsburgh, October 2016

“How to Do Things (Monadically) with Pronouns”

Philosophical Linguistics and Linguistical Philosophy (PhLiP) Conference, Tarrytown NY, September 2016

“How to Do Things (Monadically) with Pronouns”

ZAS/Berlin Dynamic Semantics Workshop, May 2016

“The Problem of Indiscernible Thoughts”

UAE University, March 2016

“The Merits of Incoherence”

NYU Abu Dhabi Workshop on Normativity, February 2016

Seminar Presentation on “Mental Graphs”

Brown, November 2015

“De Jure Codesignation”

Berkeley, November 2015

“The Merits of Incoherence”

Workshop on Defeat and Epistemic Responsibility, St Andrews, June 2015

“The Merits of Incoherence”

Rutgers Epistemology Conference, May 2015

“The Merits of Incoherence”

NYU Lunchtime Talk Series, February 2015

“The Merits of Incoherence”

XXth SOFIA Conference on Epistemic Normativity, Huatulco, January 2015

“The Merits of Incoherence”

Perspectives on Inference Conference, Center for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN), Oslo, June 2014

“Frege’s Problem and the Inadequacy of the Attitude/Content Model of the Mind”

CUNY Cognitive Science Group, March 2014

“The Merits of Incoherence”

Keynote address, University of Miami Grad Conference, January 2014

“Dynamic Anaphora, Mutation, and Monads”

NY Philosophy of Language Workshop, December 2013

“The Merits of Incoherence”

Cornell, November 2013

“The Merits of Incoherence”

Workshop on Epistemic Justification and Reasons, Luxembourg, November 2013

“The Merits of Incoherence”

Workshop on New Perspectives on External World Skepticism, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP), July 2013

Roundtable Leader

NYU Conference on the A Priori, La Pietra, Florence, June 2013

“Acquaintance, Mental Files, and Mental Graphs”

UC Irvine, May 2013

“Donkey Anaphora, Mutation, and State Monads”

NY Philosophical Logic Group, April 2013

“Acquaintance, Mental Files, and Mental Graphs”

Conference on Reference and Rationality, Franklin and Marshall College, March 2013

“The Essence and Inevitability of Hyper-Evaluative Semantics”

Conference on The Philosophy of Kit Fine, NYU, January 2013

“The Essence and Inevitability of Hyper-Evaluative Semantics”

Seminar on Semantic Content, Oxford, January 2013

“Closure and Evidence”

Midwest Epistemology Workshop, Bloomington Indiana, September 2012

“Problems for Credulism”

Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie (GAP) 8, Konstanz, September 2012

“Problems for Credulism”

Conference on Epistemology, CSMN, Svolvær in Lofoten, Norway, May 2012

(1) “Problems for Credulism”, (2) “Deliberating, Concluding, and Entailing” and (3) “Hypothetical Oughts”

Presented to Research Group on Rationality, Institute for Advanced Studies, Hebrew University, September 2011–February 2012

“Hypothetical Oughts”

Union College, New York, April 2011

“Hypothetical Oughts”

NYU–Rutgers Epistemology Workshop, April 2011

“Hyper-Evaluativity”

Russell VII Conference, Healdsburg, California, March 2011

“Hyper-Evaluativity”

UCLA, March 2011

“Hyper-Evaluativity”

Ohio State, January 2011

“Problems for Credulism”

Skepticism and Justification Conference, Bologna, December 2010

“Problems for Credulism”

Brown, November 2010

“Hyper-Evaluativity”

Workshop on Mental Files, Paris, November 2010

“Problems for Credulism”

Workshop on Evidence, Geneva, October, 2010

“Hypothetical Oughts”

Keynote address, Central States Philosophy Conference, Detroit, September, 2010

“Hyper-Evaluativity”

Workshop on the Semantics of Predicate Logic, Bielefeld, September 2010

“Hyper-Evaluativity”

NYU La Pietra Conference, July 2010

“Hyper-Evaluativity”

Oxford, June 2010

“Problems for Credulism”

3rd Formal Epistemology Festival, Toronto, May 2010

“Conditional Epistemic Oughts”

Nebraska, April 2010

“Conditional Epistemic Oughts”

Keynote address, CUNY Grad Conference, April 2010

“Conditional Epistemic Oughts”

Basic Knowledge Workshop on Testimony and Epistemic Entitlement, Northern
Institute of Philosophy, Aberdeen, March 2010

“So-called Epistemic Oughts”

Pittsburgh, December 2009

“What Should You Do When You’re Wrong?”

Concordia, Montreal, April 2009

“So-called Epistemic Oughts”

Oberlin, April 2009

“What Should You Do When You’re Wrong?”

Urbana–Champaign, March 2009

“Dogmatism, Credulism, and Probability”

Conference on the Epistemology of Perceptual Judgment, Brown, February 2009

“Why We Need Acquaintance”

Workshop on Singular Thoughts, Barcelona, January 2009

“So-called Epistemic Oughts”

MIT, December 2008

“So-called Epistemic Oughts”

Austin, November 2008

“So-called Epistemic Oughts”

World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul, July 2008

“Undermining and Inference”

Conference on Inferential Internalism, University of Fribourg, June 2008

Comments on Juan Comesana

NYU Conference on Skepticism, La Pietra, Florence, June 2008

“Undermining and Inference”

University of York, May 2008

Comments on Tim Williamson

Wisconsin Epistemology Conference, Madison, May 2008

“When Warrant Transmits”

Brown, April 2008

(1) “Uncertainty and Undermining” and (2) “When Warrant Transmits”

St Andrews, November 2007

“When Warrant Transmits”

Boulder, Colorado, November 2007

“When Warrant Transmits”

Ewha Women’s University, Seoul, June 2007

(1) “When Warrant Transmits” and (2) “Uncertainty and Undermining”

RSSS/ANU, June 2007

“When Warrant Transmits”

University of Sydney, May 2007

“When Warrant Transmits”

Hong Kong University, May 2007

“Perceptual Justification and Moore’s Proof of the External World”

University at Buffalo, April 2007

Comments on Chalmers

Pacific Division APA, San Francisco, April 2007

“Justified Perceptual Belief”

Reed College, April 2007

“Reasons and That-Clauses”

XVIIth SOFIA Conference on the Metaphysics of Epistemology, Cancún, Mexico, January 2007

“Warrant-Transmission”

Indiana, November 2006

“Warrant-Transmission”

Keynote address, Rochester Grad Conference, October 2006

“Warrant-Transmission”

CUNY, October 2006

“Warrant-Transmission”

UNAM, Mexico City, October 2006

“Hyper-Reliability and Apriority”

Aristotelian Society, London, May 2006

(1) “Externalism about Content and McKinsey-style Reasoning” and (2) “Hyper-Reliability and Apriority”

St Andrews, May 2006

“Hyper-Reliability and Apriority”

Vermont, April 2006

“Fatalism: Do Our Efforts Make Any Difference?”

West Point, March 2006

Comments on Michael Devitt and George Bealer

Eastern Division APA, New York, December 2005

Comments on John Hawthorne

Rutgers Semantics Workshop, September 2005

“Uncertainty and Undermining”

2nd Formal Epistemology Workshop, University of Texas at Austin, May 2005

“Externalism about Content and McKinsey-style Reasoning”

Conference on Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, Kentucky, April 2005

“Externalism about Content and McKinsey-style Reasoning”

University of Barcelona, April 2005

Comments on Paul Boghossian

XVIth SOFIA Conference, Huatulco, Mexico, January 2005

“Acquaintance and Evidence”

USC, November 2004

“An Epistemic Theory of Acquaintance”

Workshop on De Re Representation and the New Theory of Reference, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, September 2004

“Indexicality and A Priority”

Workshop on the A Priori, Syracuse, August 2004

“Indexicality and A Priority”

Conference on Self-Knowledge and the Self, Bigorio, Switzerland, August 2004

“An Epistemic Theory of Acquaintance”

NYU Conference on Consciousness and Intentionality, La Pietra, Florence, June 2004

“An Epistemic Theory of Acquaintance”

Conference on Content and Concepts, Santa Barbara, February 2004

“An Epistemic Theory of Acquaintance”

Eastern Division APA, Washington DC, December 2003

“What is De Re Thought?”

Berkeley, October 2003

“What’s Allowed To Be a Justifier?”

University of York, June 2003

“What’s Allowed To Be a Justifier?”

Jowett Society, Oxford, June 2003

“Epistemic Agency”

University of Kansas, April 2003

Comments on John Hawthorne

Pacific Division APA, San Francisco, March 2003

“In Defense of Immediate Justification”

Princeton, March 2003

“In Defense of Immediate Justification”

UNC–Chapel Hill, January 2003

“Anti-Given Arguments and Epistemic Recipes”

NYU, December 2002

Comments on Ernest Sosa

Conference on Contextualism in Epistemology and Beyond, UMass–Amherst, October 2002

“Does Moore’s Argument Beg the Question?”

Summer School on Epistemology and Cognition, Paris, July 2002

“Externalism about Content and McKinsey-style Reasoning”
Colloquium on Self-Knowledge, University of Utah, April 2002

“Is Moore’s Argument an Example of Transmission-Failure?”
Pacific Division APA, Seattle, March 2002

“Externalism about Content and McKinsey-style Reasoning”
Brown, March 2002

“Is Moore’s Argument an Example of Transmission-Failure?”
Wake Forest University, November 2001

“Is Moore’s Argument an Example of Transmission-Failure?”
University of Arizona, November 2001

“Is Moore’s Argument an Example of Transmission-Failure?”
UNAM Conference on Skepticism, Mexico City, August 2001

“Bad Intensions” (with Alex Byrne)
Barcelona Workshop on Two-Dimensionalism, June 2001

“Externalism about Content and Modus Ponens Reasoning”
Stanford, May 2000

Roundtable Panelist
Rutgers Epistemology Conference, April 2001

“Externalism about Content and Modus Ponens Reasoning”
UNAM Conference on Language, Mind and World, Tlaxcala, Mexico, March 2001

“Externalism about Content and Modus Ponens Reasoning”
Penn, March 2001

“Closure and Externalism about Content”
University of Rochester, November 2000

Comments on Gabriele Usberti
Conference on Justification and Meaning, Siena, June 2000

“What Do We Know A Priori about Water?”
Brown, May 2000

Comments on Michael Tooley
Pacific Division APA, Albuquerque, April 2000

“What Do We Know A Priori about Water?”
Rutgers, March 2000

“What Do We Know A Priori about Water?”
Brandeis, March 2000

“What Do We Know A Priori about Water?”
Vassar, February 2000

“A Dogmatist’s Account of Perceptual Justification”

NYU, April 1999

“The Best Form of Skeptical Argument”

Columbia, December 1998

“The Skeptic and the Dogmatist”

University of York, June 1998

Comments on Scott Sturgeon

Eastern Division APA, Philadelphia, December 1997

“Do We Perceive Things or Their Effects?”

UCLA, January 1996

“Do We Perceive Things or Their Effects?”

University of Michigan, January 1996

“Deflating Experience”

European Congress of Analytic Philosophy (ECAP) 1, Aix en Provence, April 1993

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