Topics in Epistemology

This seminar will start with some of my own papers as a skeleton to explore a series of issues. A recurring theme for several of them is the relation between traditional epistemic notions and their formal counterparts.

  1. why epistemological relations can't be a functions of contents alone
  2. the relation between all-or-nothing concepts of belief and degree-like notions
  3. how to formally model agnosticism
  4. the epistemic impact of unjustified beliefs, and of agnosticism
  5. undermining defeat, especially the putative defeat offered by (higher-order) evidence that your other (first-order) evidence is defective
  6. how to formally model undermining defeat
  7. when are non-deductive versions of conditional proof good forms of reasoning?
  8. issues about when reasoning is question-begging, which has been discussed in the literature under the headings of "transmission-failure," "easy knowledge," and "bootstrapping"

My own views have come under criticism for being incompatible with Bayesianism. If we manage to work through all these issues, you'll be in a good position to evaluate that criticism at the end of the semester.

How formal we get in the seminar will depend on the aptitudes and interests of the participants. I won't expect you to know very much formal epistemology at the start, but you should be willing to learn.

Faculty and so on are permitted to attend---though they should refrain from dominating the discussion. Philosophy grads from NYU and elsewhere are welcome; speak to me if you have questions about the suitability of your background. Other grad students must consult with me before registering for the course, to determine whether the seminar will be accessible.

Meeting time and place

Mondays 4-6 in 2nd floor Philosophy seminar room

Readings

The papers of mine we'll begin with are:

  1. "There is Immediate Justification"
  2. "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist"
  3. "What's Wrong With Moore's Argument"
  4. "When Warrant Transmits"

These will introduce many of the issues we'll be considering, in a synoptic if biased way.

Readings for April 12

  1. Christensen on normative impact of higher-order evidence:

  2. (read together with Christensen's "HOE") Barnett work-in-progress

  3. Matt Kotzen, "A Formal Account of Evidential Defeat" (manuscript)

  4. (we're leading up to this, but probably won't get to it next week) Jonathan Weisberg, "Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers", BJPS 60 (2009)

Background reading:

  1. Roger White, "Problems for Dogmatism" Phil Studies 131 (2006)

  2. Stew Cohen, "Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge" PPR 65 (2002)

  3. (reply to Cohen) Peter Markie, "Easy Knowledge" PPR 70 (2005)

  4. (reply to Markie) Stew Cohen, "Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge" PPR 70 (2005)

Readings for March 29

  1. We'll finally get to Kolodny

  2. Christensen on normative impact of higher-order evidence:

  3. (read together with Christensen's "HOE") Barnett work-in-progress

Readings for March 22

  1. Niko Kolodny, "Why Be Rational?" Mind 114 (2005)
  2. (optional) John MacFarlane and Niki Kolodny, "Ifs and Oughts"

Readings for March 1

  1. Broome, ...
  2. Mark Schroeder, "The Scope of Instrumental Reason" Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004).
  3. (optional) Daniel Bonevac, "Against Conditional Obligation" Nous 32 (1998).
  4. (optional) Mark Schroeder, Do Oughts Take Propositions?

Other Readings

Our other readings will mostly be drawn from the bibliography below. I do not expect us to discuss or read all of this list; it will be expanded or pruned as we proceed. What order we discuss issues in may also change in light of how our discussions go. But we'll begin with the order given above, as a proposal.

Many of the following papers I know to be useful; others I've just seen that people are working on and they sound relevant. Some of these latter papers may not yet be available.

Our other readings will mostly be drawn from the bibliography below. I do not expect us to discuss or read all of this list; it will be expanded or pruned as we proceed. What order we discuss issues in may also change in light of how our discussions go. But we'll begin with the order given above, as a proposal.

Many of the following papers I know to be useful; others I've just seen that people are working on and they sound relevant. Some of these latter papers may not yet be available.

Formal Representations of Agnosticism and Simple Belief

"Wide Scoping", and the Epistemic Effects of Bad Beliefs

Undermining and Higher-Order Evidence

Inductive Conditional Proof

Papers on Bootstrapping and Easy Knowledge

Papers on Transmission-Failure

Bayesian-based Criticisms of Dogmatism

Miscellaneous