Spring 2004

Theory of Knowledge Coursepack

Table of Contents

1. Peter Unger, "A defense of skepticism" Philosophical Review 80 (1971), pp. 198-218. Reprinted in George Pappas and Marshall Swain, eds., Essays on Knowledge and Justification (Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, 1978), pp. 317-36.
2. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1981), pp. 167-69
3. John Pollock and Joseph Cruz, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Rowman & Littlefield, Totowa, NJ, 1999), pp. 2-5.
4. Philosophical Issues in the Matrix <http://www.princeton.edu/~jimpryor/courses/epist/notes/matrix.html>
5. Rene Descartes, First Meditation, Meditations on First Philosophy (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 12-15.
6. Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics (Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1993), pp. 19-21, 56-69.
7. Selection from George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (London, Secker & Warburg, 1949), pp. 245-53, 265-7.
8. James Pryor, "What's so bad about living in the Matrix?" <http://whatisthematrix.warnerbros.com/rl_cmp/new_phil_fr_pryor.html>
9. Barry Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1984), Chapter 1 [pp. 1-38].
10. David Blumenfeld and Jean Blumenfeld, "Can I know that I am not dreaming?," in Michael Hooker, ed. Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, Baltimore, 1978), pp. 234-55.
11. Edmund Gettier, "Is justified true belief knowledge?," Analysis 23 (1963), pp. 121-23. Reprinted in Paul K. Moser, ed., Empirical Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, Totowa, NJ, 1986), pp. 231-33.
12. Gilbert Harman, selections from Thought (Princeton Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 142-149.
13. Alvin Goldman, "Discrimination and perceptual knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), pp. 771-791.
14. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1981), pp. 172-85, 197-217.
15. Barry Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1984), Chapter 2 [pp. 39-82].
16. Stewart Cohen, "Skepticism and everyday knowledge attributions," in Michael D. Roth and Glenn Ross, eds. Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990), pp. 161-9.
17. Fred Dretske, "The pragmatic dimension of knowledge," Philosophical Studies 40 (1981), pp. 363-78.
18. Stewart Cohen, "Skepticism, relevance, and relativity," in Brian McLaughlin, ed. Dretske and His Critics (Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp. 17-37.
19. Keith DeRose, "Contextualism: an explanation and defense" in John Greco and Ernest Sosa, eds., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. (Blackwell, Malden, Mass., 1999), pp. 187-205.
20. Selections from Ernest Sosa, "Skepticism and contextualism" Philosophical Issues 10 (2000), pp. 1-10.
21. Selections from Hilary Kornblith, "The Contextualist evasion of epistemology" Philosophical Issues 10 (2000), pp. 24-30.
22. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Holt, New York, 1912), Ch. 1-2 [pp. 7-27].
23. David Armstrong, "Is introspective knowledge incorrigible?" Philosophical Review (1963) 72, pp. 417-32.
24. Georges Dicker, Perceptual Knowledge (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1980), pp. 11-46.
25. Alvin Goldman, "What is justified belief?," in George Pappas, ed. Justification and Knowledge (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979), pp. 1-23.
26. Laurence BonJour, "Externalist theories of empirical knowledge," in P.A. French, T.E. Uehling and Howard Wettstein, eds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980), pp. 53-73.
27. Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, "Internalism defended" American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001), pp. 1-18.
28. Laurence BonJour, "Can empirical knowledge have a foundation?," American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978), pp. 1-13.
29. Laurence BonJour, "The dialectic of foundationalism and coherentism," in John Greco and Ernest Sosa, eds., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell, Malden, Mass., 1999), SS1-4 [pp. 117-30, 139-40].
30. William Alston, "Level confusions in epistemology," in P.A. French, T.E. Uehling and Howard Wettstein, eds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980), pp. 135-50. Reprinted in his Epistemic Justification (Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, 1989), pp. 153-71.
31. William Alston, "What's wrong with immediate knowledge?," Synthese 55 (1983), pp. 73-95. Reprinted in his Epistemic Justification (Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, 1989), pp. 57-78.
32. James Pryor, "The skeptic and the dogmatist" Nous 34 (2000), pp. 517-49.

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