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The Indispensability of Sinn

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The Indispensability of *Sinn* Graeme Forbes

I.

In this paper I propose a neo-Fregean semantic analysis of those belief ascriptions in which names are used to specify the content of the belief.¹ My analysis will justify the intuition that substitution inferences, such as *A*, are invalid rather than merely pragmatically deficient:

- A* (1) Lois believes that Clark Kent can't fly
 (2) Clark Kent is Superman
∴ (3) Lois believes that Superman can't fly.²

But the reason for substitution failure will not be traced to a shift in the semantic function of the name used in the content specification, as it is in Frege's own account and in quotational analyses. All these agree that the "Clark Kent" of (1) is not performing its usual semantic task of referring to a certain individual. But we can have failure of substitution of coreferential names even when the names are functioning normally, as is clear from Quine's example: Giorgione is so called because of his size, Giorgione is Barbarelli, but it is false that Barbarelli is so called because of his size.³ In the premise, "Giorgione" surely does no more or less than refer to a certain individual. The problem with the substitution is rather that it changes the reference of "so called," a phrase we may term a *logophor*, since it makes back-reference to a word. The analysis to

¹The analysis is designed to complement that of ascriptions employing indexicals given in my "Indexicals and Intensionality: A Fregean Perspective," *The Philosophical Review* 96 (1987), pp. 3–33. But the present paper can be read independently.

²For the rest of this paper, treat the *Superman* fiction as fact. See Nathan Salmon's *Frege's Puzzle* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1986), for a defense of the view that the problems with *A* are pragmatic.

³See "Reference and Modality," in *From a Logical Point of View* (New York, N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 139.

be developed here will uncover a logophor in belief ascriptions, assimilating the fallacy in *A* to the fallacy in Quine's example.

Fregean senses, and in particular the senses of names, play a crucial role in the apparatus I employ. Hence my whole project is threatened by the work of a number of philosophers of language who seem to demonstrate that the notion of the Fregean sense of a name is chimerical. For a sense is supposed to determine the reference of the name which expresses it. And are there not examples, particularly due to Kripke, which show that there is no requirement that a reference-determining sense be associated with a name, and examples which show that even in cases where there is a reasonable candidate for the role of the sense of the name, that candidate may determine the *wrong* reference?⁴ The force of Kripke's cases cannot be gainsaid, but I believe the account of the senses of names in Section II below is immune to their threat. So I will use that account in Section III to formulate a Fregean analysis of name-employing attitude ascriptions. And in Section IV, I will apply this analysis to Kripke's well-known "puzzle about belief."

II.

My view is that it has not been established that there are no such things as Fregean senses for proper names, but only that "famous deeds" sense theories (Lewis's phrase) are wrong. And not all sense theories need be of this sort. Trivially, the constraint any acceptable account of the senses of names must satisfy is that two names with the same sense are intersubstitutable *salva veritate* in any intensional context (such as an attitude context, or "it is *a posteriori* that," or "it is uninformative that"). In addition, a description should exchange with any name whose sense is the sense of that description, *if* there are any such pairs of expressions. But it is an open question whether there are. I take senses to be theoretical entities with explanatory properties, entities posited by the semantic theorist to explain the semantic intuitions of language understanders. For example, Frege arrives at the notion of sense by elaborating his intuitions about certain identity sentences. The

⁴See Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980). I have in mind particularly the Gödel/Schmidt case (p. 84) and the Feynman/Gell-Man case (p. 91).

property of a sense which explains our intuitions about propositions of which it is a constituent I call its *cognitive significance*. It is the cognitive significance of a thought which determines that the believer will take a particular attitude to it, given his relations to other thoughts and his sensory input. Cognitive significance is individuated intensionally: thoughts *p* and *q* have the same cognitive significance if and only if it is *a priori* that no rational being who grasps both takes an attitude to one at some time which he does not also take to the other at that time. But two expressions whose senses have the same cognitive significance are not *ipso facto* expressions with the same sense. In particular, the sense of a description may *encapsulate* the cognitive significance of the sense of a singular term without there being any literal *sameness* of the senses of the description and the term. This would happen when the sense of the description is structured and the sense of the singular term unstructured. For example, Peacocke has claimed (in my terminology) that “the subject of *this* experience” encapsulates the cognitive significance of the first-person type of mode of presentation (the type tokens of which each of us employs in his or her “I myself” thoughts).⁵ Here we have sameness of cognitive significance but not sameness of sense, since in thinking an “I myself” thought one does not *ipso facto* make reference to a present experience, while sameness of sense would require sameness of reference.⁶

The distinction between a sense and the cognitive significance it bears does not by itself circumvent objections to “famous deeds”

⁵See Christopher Peacocke, *Sense and Content* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 109–133. My debt to Peacocke’s account of demonstratives in Chapters 5 and 6 is considerable.

⁶If a description merely articulates the cognitive significance of a name, then there is no reason to expect it to be substitutable for the name in *modal* contexts: after all, making the replacement yields a different proposition. But the difference made by such substitution may seem too small for a consequence as large as change of truth value to follow. I should back up my claim that interchangeability in modal contexts is not implied by my approach with a detailed semantics for modal contexts. Such a semantics may be found in my *Languages of Possibility* (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1989). The leading idea is that a modal operator refers to a function whose argument is not the *sense* of the sentence within its scope but the *type of state of affairs* which the sentence describes (on my approach, states of affairs described by sentences containing non-referential descrip-

sense theories, since any reasonable account of the cognitive significance of an expression E should interchange *salva veritate* with E in the context “it is *a priori* that,” so long as E is not itself within the scope of further modal or attitude contexts. That is, the substitution should save truth value even if the expressions being exchanged do not have numerically identical senses. To respond to Kripke’s critique of sense theories, therefore, we need at least an account of the cognitive significance of the sense of a name which can replace the name in the context “it is *a priori* that” without affecting truth value.

My account is based on the metaphor of a cognitive “operating system” and the following hypothesis about the role of names in it. When we receive what we take to be *de re* information which we have an interest in retaining, our operating system may create a locus, or dossier, where such information is held; and any further information which we take to be about the same object can be filed along with the information about it we already possess.⁷ More precisely, the system files what I call “classified conditions”; a condition stands for something an object can satisfy, and the classifier is what specifies the subject’s attitude to a certain related proposition. Possible classifiers for conditions are “believed to be true” and “hoped to be true.” The role of a name is to identify a file for a particular object—as I shall put it, we use names to “label” dossiers. In sum, then, on coming across a new name, one which is taken to stand for some particular individual, the system creates a dossier labelled with that name and puts those classified conditions into it which are associated with the name.

The hypothesis about cognitive significance which this metaphor suggests is that the sense of a name “NN” has the cognitive significance “the subject of *this* dossier,” where the dossier referred to is the one labelled “NN”: our way of thinking of NN is *as* the subject of this dossier. Less technically, the cognitive significance of the

tions are quantified, or general, states of affairs, not singular ones). However, a proposition obtains a modal status *derivatively*, from the type of state of affairs of which it is a way of thinking. So despite the different treatments of modality and attitudes, an argument like “B believes that S, □S, ∴ B believes something necessary,” is still correct.

⁷I borrow the term “dossier” from Gareth Evans. See his *The Varieties of Reference* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 399.

sense is “the person/thing this body of information is about” (which gives a certain primacy to the “believed to be true” classifier). Such a cognitive significance dovetails with the fact that associated with an ordinary proper name there is no canonical way of thinking of an individual of the sort which “famous deeds” sense theories have posited, not even a way that is canonical merely for a particular thinker at a particular time. The hypothesis also explains how an agent reasons with propositions that have the sense of a name as a constituent: if the cognitive significance is “the subject of *this* dossier,” then in deciding on an attitude to take towards a currently entertained proposition which would be expressed using the name, a thinker may activate any classified condition in the dossier, he may delete conditions in the light of new evidence or changes in his desires, or he may add new conditions, all without affecting the sense of the name or its cognitive significance. However, it is important that the cognitive significance be explained in terms of the notion of being the *subject* of a dossier. As Kripke’s examples show, this is not the same notion as that of being the object which *satisfies* the dossier.⁸ Explaining “subject of” is a further task, but I see no reason why the Fregean cannot simply adopt a causal theory of this concept if he finds a plausible one.

This is to say that the causal approach to reference is not at all inimical to a Fregean semantics if the notion of the sense of a name is explained as above. But Frege held that the sense of a name *determines* its reference, and it might seem that I have just abandoned that aspect of his view. I do not think this is so. A sense of the sort that a name might express is a representation of an individual, and there are two ways in which a familiar type of representation, such as a photograph, can reasonably be said to determine an object. In the case of a portrait photograph, there is the object it is of, and (perhaps) the object it *best resembles*. A sense

⁸Suppose (a) the condition of being F is in B’s “NN” dossier, classified as “believed true,” and (b) B comes to believe that nothing is F. Then if B’s sense for “NN” has the cognitive significance “the satisfier of this dossier,” B would have to conclude (if he retains “is F” in the dossier) that there is no such person as NN, or (if he deletes it) that *now* there may be such a person as NN. Either way he cannot make the simple belief revision “NN isn’t F after all” which an adequate theory should permit him.

determines an object as the object it is *of*, which, at least in easy cases, is the object at the start of the channel along which the *de re* information in the dossier has flowed to the thinker. It is just a prejudice to insist that senses must have qualitative features by which they determine objects via satisfaction, as if we somehow first formulate ways of thinking of things independently of cognitive encounters with the world, and are then faced with the problem of finding entities to fit.⁹

I intend these hypothetical features of the language faculty's architecture to be characteristic of the "standing" *de re* ways of thinking of objects typically expressed by ordinary names, as opposed to the "occasional" *de re* senses of demonstratives and indexicals, and more pertinently, as opposed to the senses of expressions which seem only to express ways of thinking of specific things. Suppose, to adapt Russell's example, that as a result of regaining your confidence in the integrity of electoral processes in Louisiana, you come to believe that the official winner of the next election will in fact be the candidate who gets the most votes. This does not mean that you have a dossier labelled "official winner of the next election" and that you express a sense with the cognitive significance "subject of *this* dossier" when you use that description. There is no specific individual of whom you are thinking when you use that description, and this is something of which you are quite aware. It is for that very reason that no dossier is created: you do not take yourself to be having cognitive encounters with a subject of some body of information that is growing as the encounters proceed.¹⁰

How does my hypothesis about cognitive significance fare with the test of substitutability within the scope of "it is *a priori* that"? It is *a priori* for any subject B who understands the name "NN" that

⁹For more on the issues of this paragraph, see John McDowell, "De Re Senses," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 35 (1984), pp. 98–109.

¹⁰I include being told or misinformed about a thing as ways of cognitively encountering it. See *Languages of Possibility*, p. 118 for further discussion of the distinction between *de re* and *de dicto* senses. My use of the phrase "ordinary name" in this paragraph is intended to bracket off the question of descriptive names, which in my view do not express ways of thinking of specific objects (*ibid.*, p. 155) and of empty names which the subject mistakenly takes to be like other ordinary names ("Zeus"). I have no settled view of what to say about names of this sort.

NN is NN. Is it *a priori* for any such B that NN is the subject of *this* dossier, where the reference is to B's "NN"-dossier? The answer to this question may seem to depend in part on what account is given of the cognitive significance of the sense of the demonstrative "*this* dossier." Two possible candidates, between which I will not try to adjudicate here, are "the dossier in which *this* information is stored" and "the dossier *this* name labels." However, neither candidate is of a nature to guarantee that "NN is the subject of *this* dossier" is *a priori* when the demonstrated dossier is labelled "NN," so we ought to consider specific cases in which this proposition is apparently subject to challenge.

There is a kind of situation where one makes the *a posteriori* discovery that NN is *not* the subject of a certain dossier. Suppose that in conversation with others you have picked up a little information about someone called "NN," enough for your mental operating system to have created a dossier labelled "NN" and filed those scraps of information in it. Later you have a number of encounters with someone whom you take to be NN, and your "NN"-dossier rapidly fills with conditions derived from these encounters. After a while, you learn that the person with whom you have had the encounters is in fact MM, not NN. In this situation, it seems reasonable for you to say "NN is not the subject of this dossier" or "NN is not the person whom all this information is about"; you do not seem to be contradicting an *a priori* truth.

I doubt that this is a counterexample to my proposal. Precisely what is going on here depends on the explanation one gives of why "NN is the subject of *this* dossier" is *a priori* for you before you discover your error of identification. According to one account, it is *a priori* for you because "NN" is a name in your idiolect for MM and your dossier is dominated by information about MM, making MM its subject. MM is both the reference of the name and the subject of the dossier because of the role MM played in the processes by which you acquired the bulk of the information in the dossier and which elicit your uses of "NN." On this view, when you learn "this person is MM, not NN," your mental operating system relabels with "MM" the dossier previously labelled "NN" and creates a new dossier labelled "NN" into which is transferred the information for which the now relabelled dossier was first created, before your encounters with MM. When you now say "NN is not the subject of this dossier" the demonstrative refers to the old dos-

sier which you have relabelled “MM,” while “NN” has a new sense, and also a new reference (the subject of the newly created dossier). So you are not really controverting the proposition you previously expressed with “NN is the subject of *this* dossier,” the proposition which my account implies is *a priori*, since that is not the proposition you now express with these words. Furthermore, once the new dossier has been created, the transfer executed and the labelling done, it is not a *further* empirical discovery that MM is the subject of *this* dossier and NN the subject of *that* one. So the truths of the same form as “NN is the subject of *this* dossier,” where the demonstrative refers to the dossier labelled by the displayed name, are *a priori* truths (it would be *a posteriori* that MM is, or is not, the subject of the “NN” dossier).

An alternative explanation of why “NN is the subject of *this* dossier” was previously *a priori* for you, though you can now truly say “NN is not the subject of *this* dossier,” involves no change of sense in “NN.” On this account, your original introduction to the name “NN” was sufficient to establish its public reference in your mouth. And each time you make an observation of MM and enter “is F” into your “NN” dossier, what you think is: “*that* man is F, and that man is NN, so NN is F.” Hence you file a piece of misinformation about NN in your “NN” dossier, a dossier of which NN is the subject simply because you use “NN” in the kind of Identity Elimination illustrated and your introduction to the name automatically brought with it its public reference. When you learn your mistake, you transfer the misinformation out of your “NN” dossier, putting it into a newly created dossier labelled “MM” and leaving only the original information about NN in your “NN” dossier. So you can now truly say “NN is not the subject of *this* dossier” so long as “*this* dossier” refers to the newly created “MM” dossier (if it refers to the old dossier, the statement is false). Either way, then, “NN is the subject of *this* dossier” is *a priori* true before you discover your error, and afterwards there is both a true proposition you can express with “NN is not the subject of *this* dossier” and an *a priori* proposition you can express with “NN is the subject of *this* dossier.”¹¹

¹¹Since both analyses are consistent with my claims about what is *a priori*, I shall not argue for one over the other. However, my view is that if the second analysis were applied across the board, no explanation of how

The example just discussed involves a correct revision of a cognitive filing system prompted by new information to the effect that there are two people where previously you thought there was only one. Mark Richard has raised the question of what happens when we make an incorrect revision based on misinformation that there is only one person where previously you thought (correctly) that there were two. Suppose you already know quite a lot about Mark Twain and quite a lot about Herman Melville and then come to believe that Twain and Melville are the same person. Does this mean that two dossiers are merged into one? If so, Richard points out, the description “the subject of *this* dossier” is improper. Furthermore, if in this state of confusion you say “Melville wrote *Huckleberry Finn*,” there is an intuition not merely that you *say* that Melville wrote *Huckleberry Finn*, but that you believe this too. Granting the intuition, I therefore conclude that the moral of the example is that pre-existing dossiers are not merged when an identity comes to be accepted, or at least not straight away. Rather, the misinformation “is identical to Melville” is filed in the Twain dossier and the misinformation “is identical to Twain” is filed in the Melville dossier, so that the two names do not come to have the same sense. And when the speaker produces a statement such as “Melville wrote *Huckleberry Finn*” where he would previously have used the other name, he is extracting the believed condition and the identity from his “Twain” dossier and applying Identity Elimination. A kind of cognitive inertia seems to be in effect: when you come to believe that one dossier has been generated by two objects, your cognitive operating system is obliged to restructure your files in order to allow coherent singular thought about what you now take to be two objects. But if you come to believe in the identity of things which you hitherto took to be distinct, your system is not subject to any sanction if it maintains the dossiers as separate, filing conditions more immediately associated with one particular

sense determines reference would have been given. But we can employ Evans’s producer/consumer distinction here (*op. cit.*, Chapter 11). Even if it is true that for consumers, introduction to the name brings its public reference with it, the first analysis, with which the position that sense determines reference sits better, would be more appropriate for producers. Since it is they who establish the public reference of a name, sense would determine reference indirectly, via producers, for consumers.

name in that name's dossier only, so long as the system implements Leibniz's Law.

Finally, my approach to names suggests an account of what it is for two names to have the same sense: it is for both names to label the same dossier. This could come about as follows. Add the character of Ralph to the Superman story, Ralph being someone who has never heard of either Superman or Clark Kent, and imagine that Superman encounters Ralph and explains his double life to him, introducing himself by both the names he uses: "I am known both as 'Superman' and as 'Clark Kent'." It seems reasonable to assume that the system which creates dossiers is governed by the constraint that in setting up new ones for new names it should aim for a one-one correspondence with the purported objects. So Ralph's system would create only a single, double-labelled dossier, and so long as Ralph's access to his cognitive system is unimpaired, the proposition that Superman is Clark Kent would be as self-evident to him as the proposition that Clark Kent is Clark Kent.¹² A simpler example of the same phenomenon occurs when someone introduces herself with both a real name and a nickname, as in "My name is Kimberley but my friends call me Berry." It would be unmotivated to suppose that in such a situation you create two dossiers. Rather, the two names label the same dossier and consequently have the same sense. For while it is one thing to think of an object x as the subject of *this* dossier and a different thing to think of x as the subject of *that* one, the difference vanishes if it is the same dossier that is activated when either of two names is processed, provided that the fact that it is the same dossier being readied for action is somehow manifest to the subject. And the manifestness of such features of cognitive operations is the best explanation of our ability to find some identity statements informative and others uninformative.

I have argued that an approach to the senses of names in terms

¹²I offer an account of how the uninformativeness of such propositions could arise as a consequence of the retrieval procedures of a cognitive operating system in my "Cognitive Architecture and the Semantics of Belief," in *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language II*, ed. P. A. French et al. (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1989). The final version of the present paper postdates that one, which is mainly about the Mates problem. Where the two differ, "Indispensability" states the position I would defend.

of cognitive significance, using the metaphor of operating system and dossier, goes some way to filling in the details of a Fregean semantics of names which is not threatened by Kripke's refutation of "famous deeds" theories. So we are free to entertain seriously the thought that it is the Fregean approach, and only it, which provides the machinery to give a semantics for attitude contexts which does justice to our intuitions as language understanders. Hence the title of this paper.

III.

Frege abstracted from the phenomenon of intersubjective variation in sense.¹³ The analysis of attitude attributions using names that he proposed under this abstraction seems to me to be the best available, once we are reassured of the respectability of the notion of the sense of a name. But we cannot ignore intersubjective variation. If there are ever two names with the same sense for you and different senses for me, then the sense of at least one name varies intersubjectively. And on my own account, while it may be said that names share the same *type* of cognitive significance, their token senses have a private aspect, since only I am in a position to think in a purely demonstrative way about my stores of information, and only you are in a position to think in that way about yours.¹⁴ However, taking account of intersubjective variation raises questions to which the Fregean should have answers. According to Frege, if A utters, "B believes that S," then A uses S to refer to its customary sense.¹⁵ But if S has one customary sense for A and another for B, *which* sense is referred to in A's utterance?

¹³He thought no such variation would arise in "the theoretical structure of a demonstrative science." See his "On Sense and Reference," in *Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, ed. P. Geach and M. Black (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1970), p. 58n.

¹⁴Here I may be violating Frege's publicity requirement on senses, but I am not violating its point, which is to ensure the possibility of communication. Senses with a private aspect are a bar to communication only if grasp of another's proposition implies the ability to use its constituent senses in thoughts of one's own. But there is no reason to think that every acceptable account of communication must have this implication. See "Indexicals and Intensionality," pp. 20–21.

¹⁵I explain the rationale for Frege's "customary reference displacement" thesis in "Indexicals and Intensionality," p. 5.

Let us take a concrete example. Treat the Superman story as fact and suppose that Ralph is as described at the end of the last section; that is, for him the names “Superman” and “Clark Kent” have the same sense (or change the example to one involving nicknames if you did not like that case). Despite the fact that for Ralph the two names have the same sense, he can still truly say such things as:

- (4) Lois believes that Superman can fly and Clark Kent can't.

If Frege's “reference-shift” analysis of intensional contexts is to be applied when we are allowing intersubjective variation in sense, then the problem is to identify the proposition to which “Superman can fly and Clark Kent can't” refers in (4). Specifically, the question is whether the names (a) refer to the senses Lois customarily expresses when she uses them, or (b) refer to the sense Ralph customarily expresses when *he* uses them, or (c) perform some other function. On the *believer-oriented* view, the names refer to their respective senses for Lois, while on the *ascriber-oriented* view, they refer to their sense for Ralph. I will now argue that neither of these options is satisfactory. But the moral I draw from this is not that Frege's account of intensional contexts is fundamentally flawed. It is rather that when we drop the idealization of intersubjective constancy of linguistic senses, the basic elements of the Fregean approach have to be deployed in a less straightforward way to get plausible semantic analyses of belief attributions. It goes without saying that when we move away from a fairly extreme idealization towards something more like the real world, we should *expect* applications of a theory to lose the stark simplicity they had when only the idealization was under consideration.

The ascriber-oriented view is refuted by the case of Ralph, for whom “Superman” and “Clark Kent” express the same sense. There is a clear intuition that Ralph can utter (4) and say something true; yet the propositions *Ralph* expresses by “Superman can fly” and “Clark Kent can't” are explicitly contradictory, though Lois does not believe an explicit contradiction. So Ralph is not referring to his own propositions. Perhaps the example will be challenged on the grounds that if the names express the same sense for Ralph, then he cannot utter (4) truly. But why could he not use (4) to express a truth? (4) is just a fact about Lois and it is hard to

see why Ralph should be prevented from expressing this fact in virtue of *superior* knowledge of what is the case.¹⁶

On the believer-oriented view, the idea is that when Ralph comes out with (4) he “aims” at Lois’s two senses with his uses of “Clark Kent” and “Superman.” The problem, of course, is to explain the mechanism by which he hits them. How is the reference accomplished? After all, Ralph may not have stood to Lois’s sense for either name in any of the familiar relations which bestow a capacity to think of an object; for example, he need not have demonstratively identified either sense. But without a mechanism, the believer-oriented view makes the capacity to refer to a sense seem like magic.

Perhaps there *is* some mechanism at work in (4) as the believer-oriented view requires, even if it is difficult to see precisely what it might be. But I shall not pursue this possibility, since I think the believer-oriented view has other drawbacks. First, it suffers from a difficulty dual to the one (4) presents for the ascriber-oriented view. The believer-oriented view implies that if Lois says of Ralph “He believes Clark Kent is Superman,” she is attributing belief in an obviously true proposition to him, since Ralph attaches the same senses to the two names. But intuitively, she is not. A further difficulty for the believer-oriented view arises from a case where Ralph says:

(5) Lois believes Matti Nykaenen can fly

while in fact Lois has never heard of the great Finnish ski jumper and does not even know of the sport of ski jumping. Then (5) is false. However, the reason it is false seems to me to be that (5) requires that Lois believe a certain proposition which in fact she does not believe, whereas the believer-oriented view would have to say that (5) is false because the embedded sentence fails to refer to

¹⁶The truth of the ascription follows from what Richard calls the Echo Principle. See his “Taking the Fregean Seriously,” in *Philosophical Analysis: A Defence by Example*, ed. David Austin (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1988), pp. 219–239. Nathan Salmon has argued that cases with (what I would describe as) the general structure “one sense for the ascriber, two or more for the believer” constitute difficulties of principle for the Fregean approach (see *Frege’s Puzzle*, Chapter 9.1). I believe the account in this paper solves the problems to which Salmon points.

any complete proposition. This does not seem right in itself, and it also generates some difficulties over negation. The negation of (5) is straightforwardly true, but a semantics in a Fregean spirit usually embodies the principle that failure of reference is contagious: if a sub-expression of a sentence S fails to refer, then any expression containing S , in particular $\lceil \sim S \rceil$, is infected in the same way as S is, and also fails to refer. Hence it is unclear that the believer-oriented view could find a well-motivated way of ascribing the truth value *True* to the negation of (5).

So it seems to me that neither of the two straightforward accounts I distinguished has much ability to deal with a wide range of cases. One might say that attitude ascriptions are ambiguous between believer-oriented and ascriber-oriented views, with disambiguation being achieved by context and charity. But I cannot find any intuitive support for the idea that (4) or (5) is ambiguous and awaits some kind of contextual input before it can be evaluated. I would prefer to find a single style of semantic analysis of belief ascriptions which works for all the cases we have considered, reserving the ambiguity hypothesis for an account of last resort.

To see our way forward, let us consider again the case where Ralph hears Lois assert “Clark Kent can’t fly” and on that basis says:

(6) Lois believes Clark Kent can’t fly.

A proposal which cuts through our difficulties here is that Ralph is referring neither to his own nor to Lois’s sense with “Clark Kent”: all he means by (6) is:

(7) Clark Kent is someone Lois believes can’t fly.

Let us use “B” for the belief relation which holds between thinkers and propositions, corners for sense quotes, and “ $\hat{\ }$ ” for the following mode of combination (partially defined function) of the senses of two expressions: if S -followed-by- S' is a meaningful expression, then $\text{Sense}(S)\hat{\ }\text{Sense}(S')$ is the sense of the expression S -followed-by- S' . In these terms, (7) is analyzed as:

(8) $(\exists \alpha)(\alpha \text{ is a way of thinking of Clark Kent} \ \& \ B(\text{Lois}, \alpha \hat{\ } \lceil \text{can't fly} \rceil))$

(in words: for some way of thinking of Clark Kent, Lois believes the proposition consisting in that way of thinking in construction with the sense of “can’t fly”).¹⁷ It is not difficult to find problems with this construal of (6). For example, Ralph ought to be willing to infer “So Lois believes Superman can’t fly,” since on the same style of semantic analysis, it follows from (6) and the identity. But he won’t be willing to infer this, and it is not obvious how to motivate analyzing his judgment “Lois believes Superman can fly” one way, and his judgment (6) a very different way, when both are based just on hearing Lois utter the associated sentences.

Reflection on this case and the previous ones indicates that the *actual name* the ascriber uses in making his ascription plays a role that none of the proposals canvassed so far has managed to capture. When Ralph says (6) he uses the name “Clark Kent” because that is the name he *heard Lois use* to express her belief. But Ralph is not using that name to refer to Lois’s sense for it, since we have already seen that this claim runs into difficulties with other cases (recall (5)). Rather, when Ralph comes out with (6), he is surmising something roughly to the effect that for Lois there is some body of classified conditions concerning Clark Kent (that is, concerning Superman) which she *associates with the name “Clark Kent”* and which includes the condition “can’t fly” classified “believed to be true.” I suggest that this is *all* he need surmise, and that it provides the material for the semantic analysis of his belief ascriptions. In other words, these ascriptions must be represented as adverting in some way to the name the believer would use in expressing the belief.¹⁸

If dossiers are labelled by names, then the sense which a name expresses may also be said to be labelled by that name, since in

¹⁷See “Indexicals and Intensionality” for this kind of regimentation. Richard justly criticizes the analysis illustrated here, *op. cit.*, p. 237, n. 12.

¹⁸A case where a name is used by A in a belief ascription to B and B has no name for the relevant object is a case where analysis in the style of (8) is called for. But B’s willingness to use a name should be distinguished from his having one in thought: B may be subject to a religious prohibition against writing or uttering the name “NN,” but that is no bar to A’s using it to specify the contents of B’s beliefs in a way that (8) does not adequately capture. Alternatively, B may have the capacity to recognize an object *x* over and over again, though he has no name for it. Such a way of thinking of *x* does not seem to me to be “namelike,” since it appears to give a special role to descriptively specifiable characteristics of *x*. If A uses a name to specify B’s beliefs in this case, analysis in the style of (8) would be appropriate, and substitution permissible.

articulating the cognitive significance of the sense we make a reference to a dossier which has the name as a label. In addition, a sense may be said to be labelled by any name which is a *linguistic counterpart* of the name used by the ascriber in specifying the proposition. I explain the notion of t' being a linguistic counterpart of t more fully below; for now, I need only say that it requires sameness of customary reference and it is always relativized to a pair of thinkers, (ascriber) A and (believer) B: I write " t' is a linguistic counterpart_{<B,A>} of t ," where t is the name the ascriber uses and t' the name the believer employs. Within the context of a use of a name "NN" by A in a belief ascription to B, a sense is then said to be *so labelled* if and only if the articulation of the cognitive significance of that sense demonstratively identifies a dossier of B's labelled by a name which is a linguistic counterpart_{<B,A>} of "NN." This allows the following *logophoric* analysis of (6):

- (9) Clark Kent is such that for Lois's so-labelled way of thinking of him α , $B(\text{Lois}, \alpha \wedge \ulcorner \text{can't fly} \urcorner)$.

(9) modifies (8) to introduce allusion to the salient name, but we have done this in such a way that (9) does not entail that Lois believes Superman can't fly. For Lois need not possess a dossier labelled "Superman" containing "can't fly" classified "believed true" even though she possesses such a dossier labelled "Clark Kent." The objectionable feature of (8) is therefore avoided.

The phrase "Lois's so-labelled way of thinking" embodies a definite description as well as a logophor ("the so-labelled way of thinking employed by Lois"), and a full regimentation of (6) would require some decisions about the syntax and semantics of descriptions. For precision, where it matters I will take a definite description to be a binary restrictive quantifier, in view of the significant structural and semantics parallels between "the F is G," "an F is G," "few Fs are G," etc. But I will not complicate my regimentations by injecting the binary quantifier formalism.¹⁹

¹⁹For a full account and persuasive arguments for the quantifier treatment of definite descriptions, see Martin Davies, *Meaning, Quantification and Necessity* (Boston, Mass.: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), Chapter VII, Section 1. On this account, definite descriptions do not *refer* to objects, though one can speak loosely of an object being "characterized" or "picked out" by the description.

The logophoric analysis gives the right results for the cases we have considered. For example, I analyze Lois's ascription to Ralph of the belief that Clark Kent is Superman as

- (10) Clark Kent is such that for Ralph's so-labelled (way of thinking of him) α , Superman is such that for Ralph's so-labelled β , $B(\text{Ralph}, \alpha \hat{=} \ulcorner \text{ } \urcorner \hat{=} \beta)$.

In the example, Ralph uses the two names with the same sense, and (10) is true when that sense is assigned to both sense variables. But we agreed that Lois's ascription is not the ascription of an obvious belief. The analysis (10) makes plain why this is so.

Second, for

- (5) Lois believes that Matti Nykaenen can fly

we have the analysis (suppressing "way of thinking of him")

- (11) Matti Nykaenen is such that for Lois's so-labelled α , $B(\text{Lois}, \alpha \hat{=} \ulcorner \text{can fly} \urcorner)$

which is straightforwardly false, provided the semantics for the description quantifier preserves the Russellian equivalence between "the F is G" and "there is exactly one F and it is G": Lois is in the belief relation to no proposition with the constituents required to make (11) true (hence the external negation of (11) is true).²⁰

In each of these cases, the linguistic counterpart of the name in the ascription is the name itself. A less trivial application of the linguistic counterpart relation is to foreign names and their translations. For example, an analysis of "Plato believed Aristotle showed promise" in the style of (9), (10) and (11) will ascribe the

²⁰It may seem that the analytic strategy illustrated by these examples will lead to excessively baroque complete analyses of "B believes that S": if all words in S are genuinely in the semantic scope of "believes," then they will all be exported and linked to a sense description involving a logophor. However, the underlying idea here can be implemented in a non-baroque way. Exploiting my modification of Frege's views about sentence reference (see note 6), the general form of the analysis would roughly be: the state of affairs that S is such that for B's so-labelled way of thinking of it, B believes that way of thinking. I hope to pursue this in a future paper.

right truth value since “Aristotle” and “Αριστοτελης” are each other’s linguistic counterparts relative to the typical English-speaking ascriber of this belief and Plato.²¹ A general principle which this case falls under is: if the ascriber and the believer each has exactly one dossier for the object x , then the ascriber can use any name labelling his dossier for x to report a belief the believer would express using one of the names labelling his dossier for x . On the other hand, the previous cases motivate the principle that if the ascriber has one dossier for x labelled with names N_1, \dots, N_n and the believer has n dossiers D_i each labelled uniquely with N_i , then the linguistic counterpart $_{\langle B,A \rangle}$ relation on this domain relative to these two thinkers is the set of pairs $\langle N_i, N_i \rangle$. Evidently, these principles cover only a fraction of the interesting examples. In the next section, I will discuss one of the hard cases, due to Kripke.²²

²¹Cross-language application of the linguistic counterpart relation affords a response to a Church-style objection put to me by Salmon. The Greek translation of (a) Plato believed Aristotle showed promise, is (b) *πλατον ωηθην τον Αριστοτελη μεγα δυνασθαι*. Now the translation of the analysis of (a) ought to be the analysis of the translation of (a), that is, the analysis of (b). But the logophors in the analyses of (a) and (b) refer to an English and a Greek word respectively. However, if, as in the normal case, the counterparts of the former are exactly the counterparts of the latter, the translation of the analysis of (a) and the analysis of the translation of (a) specify the same truth condition.

²²Richard has raised the following case. B is a bilingual who has knowledge he expresses with “NN = NN,” where “NN” is the Mandarin name of China’s capital and “=” is the ideogram for “is,” but B thinks that Beijing and Peiping are different cities (he says so in English). Why does my analysis not have the false consequence that B believes that Beijing is Peiping? This would require that B’s Mandarin name “NN” is a linguistic counterpart $_{\langle B,A \rangle}$ of both “Beijing” and “Peiping” (the ascriber’s names). Suppose that “NN” and “Beijing” have the same sense for B and that “Beijing” and “Peiping” have the same sense for the ascriber. By the principle in the text, we then have that “Beijing” is a linguistic counterpart $_{\langle B,A \rangle}$ of “Beijing” and “Peiping” is a linguistic counterpart $_{\langle B,A \rangle}$ of “Peiping.” Since “B believes that Beijing is Peiping” is false, we should conclude that “NN” is a linguistic counterpart $_{\langle B,A \rangle}$ of “Beijing” but not “Peiping”; as one might expect, “NN” is associated only with the English name whose sense it shares. The methodology I use to settle the extension of the linguistic counterpart $_{\langle B,A \rangle}$ relation follows Lewis’s procedure for determining the similarity relation on worlds which fixes the truth values of counterfactuals (see his “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow,” *Noûs* 13 (1979), pp. 455–476): we use our intuitions about which belief ascriptions are true and which false to settle what is a counterpart of what.

The logophoric analysis also has other attractive features. Special cases like fiction aside, we are intuitively reluctant to make an ascription of the form $B(x, \textit{that } c \textit{ is } F)$ if we believe c is a name which lacks a referent (an atheist who says "Mary believes God will forgive her" speaks archly). The analysis justifies this reluctance, since someone who makes such an ascription is, by (11), himself purporting to use the name to refer to an individual. Another advantage of the analysis is that it makes it easy to understand how anaphoric reference to the customary bearer of a name is effected, as by the "he" in "Lois believes Clark Kent can't fly, but in fact he can," where it is hard for a traditional Fregean approach to explain how "he" can refer to Clark if "Clark Kent" refers to a sense. These features of the analysis are aspects of a more general point. However plausible Frege's reference-shift doctrine seems in the abstract, it is difficult to escape the impression that in making an attitude ascription using a name, the ascriber makes a reference to the name's customary bearer, in addition to specifying a proposition. Appropriately, this is exactly what my account portrays the ascriber as doing. The departure from the historical Frege lies in the fact that we are not *completely* specifying the proposition the believer is said to believe; but this departure is simply what is required to accommodate the intersubjective variation from which Frege abstracted.²³

It may be asked in what sense (9) is an *analysis* of (6). After all, (6) gives little evidence of the presence of a description of a sense. I have no general theory of the nature of the relationship which holds between *analysandum* and *analysans* here. But the non-conservatism of (9) relative to (6) is quite in line with other familiar proposals in contemporary philosophy of language; consider, for

²³Castañeda's Guise Theory takes a completely different approach to these problems; see, for example, his "Method, Individuals and Guise Theory," in *Agent, Language and the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castañeda*, ed. J. Tomberlin (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1983), pp. 329–353. According to my analysis, the suspect principle of Guise Theory is that by removing a name from the content sentence in a belief ascription, one obtains something true of the individual to whom that name refers (pp. 338–339). "_____ is such that for B's so-labelled sense . . ." is not purely a condition true of individuals, since co-designative names cannot replace each other in the blank *salva veritate*, though it is undeniable that any name put in the blank performs just its usual semantic function of referring to an individual. It is also referred to by another term in the same sentence, but that is not its semantic *function*.

example, Davidson's semantic analysis of adverbial modification, which uncovers quantification over events, or Barwise and Perry's approach to seeing.²⁴ The main claim I wish to make about (9) is that it correctly articulates the way the world has to be if (6) is to be made true: it explains what constitutes the truth of (6). But in addition, I know of no compelling reason why such regimentations as (9) could not be accurate depictions of mental representations on which the human language faculty operates.

The parallel with Davidson's semantics for adverbs is useful in other respects. It is often objected to Fregean approaches to attitude ascriptions which use quantification where singular reference to a sense might have been expected, that they cannot validate intuitively correct first-order reasoning about beliefs.²⁵ And my own approach appears vulnerable to this charge. Consider the argument:

- B* (12) Ralph believes Superman can fly.
 (13) Lois believes Superman can fly.
 ∴ (14) There is something Ralph and Lois both believe.

If we give (14) its *prima facie* regimentation, " $(\exists \rho)(B(R, \rho) \ \& \ B(L, \rho))$," we see that it is not a logical consequence of (12) and (13) as I analyze them, since each of (12) and (13) has its own description quantifier over senses. But intuitively, (14) does follow from (12) and (13); therefore the logophoric analyses are wrong.

My reply to this is that *B* is exactly analogous to the following argument:

- C* (15) Ralph buttered some toast in the kitchen after midnight.
 (16) Lois buttered some toast in the kitchen after midnight.
 ∴ (17) There is something Ralph and Lois both did.

²⁴See D. Davidson, "The Logical Form of Action Sentences," in *The Logic of Decision and Action*, ed. N. Rescher (Pittsburgh, Penn.: Pittsburgh University Press, 1974), and J. Barwise and J. Perry, *Situations and Attitudes* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press), Chapter 7. There is a congenial account of the nature of this sort of analysis in Chapter 3 of *Events in the Semantics of English* by Terence Parsons (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990).

²⁵See George Bealer, *Quality and Concept* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 38, and Chapter 2 of Richard's forthcoming *Attitudes*.

The intuition that *C* is a good argument is just as firm as the corresponding intuition for *B* (even if it is not the same kitchen or the same night that is intended in the two premises). *Of course* there is something Ralph and Lois both did: they both buttered toast in the kitchen after midnight. But if (17) is given the regimentation “ $(\exists e)(\text{Act}(e) \ \& \ \text{Doer}(e, \text{Ralph}) \ \& \ \text{Doer}(e, \text{Lois}))$ ” analogous to (14), it does not follow logically from the Davidsonian analyses of (15) and (16), each of which has its own existential quantifier over events. Like (14) on its suggested analysis, (17) is not even true (unless we allow arbitrary concoctions of events to be events). I suppose one could take this to be a refutation of Davidson’s account of action sentences, but in view of everything which that account has going for it, I would not regard *modus tollens* as a serious option here.

Besides, it is not difficult for a Davidsonian unafflicted with nominalist scruples to explain why we judge *C* to be a good argument. When we say that (17) is true we are taking the quantifier to range over not particular events, but types of events, abstractions from event tokens. Thus (17) says there is an event type of a certain nature which has tokens one of which has Ralph as agent and another of which has Lois as agent. And I think that something similar is true of (14). Though Ralph and Lois do not stand in the belief relation to one and the same Fregean proposition, there are propositions they believe which are significantly similar, each involving the sense of “can fly” and a way of thinking of Superman labelled “Superman.” I take the English quantifier in (14) to range over such abstractions from token Fregean propositions. Hence (14) is true, and follows from (12) and (13), whose analyses explicitly reveal that the two beliefs are “abstractly the same.”²⁶ So I do not think that the phenomenon illustrated by *B* is a real problem, and I suspect that those who do are being simplistic in their interpretations of natural language quantifier locations.²⁷

²⁶An alternative view is that the quantifiers in *B* and *C* are substitutional. Despite criticisms of this view in Chapter 2 of Richard’s *Attitudes* I would regard it as viable if I regarded substitutional quantification as viable. But I share Van Inwagen’s doubts about its intelligibility; see his “Why I Don’t Understand Substitutional Quantification,” *Philosophical Studies* 39 (1981), pp. 281–285. Note that on my account of *B* and *C* neither is *logically* valid. But the conclusions do follow logically from the premises together with trivial principles guaranteeing that the events and propositions in question are of the same type.

²⁷To hold this paper to a reasonable length, I ignore many other inter-

IV.

Throughout this paper I have been presupposing common-sense evaluations of belief ascriptions: Lois *does* believe that Superman can fly, that Clark Kent can't, does *not* believe that Clark Kent can fly, and so on. Broadly speaking, these evaluations are arrived at by taking Lois's linguistic behavior, her assents and dissents, at face value. So once this aspect of our ordinary practice of belief ascription is accepted, we have to reject substitution of co-referential names, since this can carry us from truths to what our ordinary practice decrees to be falsehoods. It then becomes a condition of adequacy on any semantics of belief ascription that it explain why substitution fails. And it is a powerful argument for Fregean approaches that they provide the most plausible explanations.

This argument would be entirely undercut if our normal procedure of taking a subject's assents and dissents at face value could be shown to be of dubious reliability in the kinds of cases we have been considering, since it would then be dubious that substitution is in fact taking us from truths to *falsehoods*. Kripke has developed a family of cases in which our ordinary practices of belief ascription, apparently *by themselves*, lead to ascriptions which are coun-

esting issues, particularly having to do with iterated contexts, which I hope to address elsewhere. But I should respond to an objection put to me by Michael Woods about the parallel with action sentences. According to Woods, if we ask what it was that Ralph and Lois both did, the answer, butter some toast in the kitchen after midnight, actually *looks* like a specification of an action type, whereas if we ask what they both believe, the answer, that Superman can fly, appears to be a specification of a proposition *token*. But in this linguistic context, the second answer is elliptical for "Ralph and Lois both believe that Superman can fly," which in turn expands into the conjunction "Ralph believes that . . . and Lois believes that . . .," the logophoric analysis applying to each conjunct separately. So the original answer to the question specified a proposition type after all, or else had a kind of systematic ambiguity. In the same vein, we can apply the parallel with action sentences to an example suggested by Stephen Schiffer, in which there is apparently explicit singular reference to token propositions: (a) My theory is that Frege was right; (b) You believe that Frege was right; \therefore (c) You believe my theory. An appropriate parallel is (a) What I did was to butter toast in the kitchen; (b) You buttered toast in the kitchen; \therefore (c) You did what I did (or "You did the same as me").

terintuitive in the same way as (3).²⁸ He also claims (*ibid.*, p. 268) that his cases are essentially like the standard ones, such as that of Lois, and concludes that an argument for a Fregean approach from “failure of substitution” is far too quick: since it is taking the subject’s words at face value that leads to problematic ascriptions in his cases, and since this practice is relied on in the standard cases, it may be this practice itself, rather than substitution, which is questionable in the standard cases.

In this final section, I will use the logophoric analysis to argue that the appearance of paradox in the ascriptions we make if we take the subject’s words at face value in Kripke’s cases is superficial. By contrast, the ascriptions to which substitution leads are genuinely objectionable, so an argument for a Fregean approach from failure of substitution is well founded. Here is Kripke’s central example:

Peter . . . may learn the name ‘Paderewski’ with an identification of the person named as a famous pianist . . . and we can infer

(18) Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent.

Later, in a different circle, Peter learns of someone called ‘Paderewski’ who was a Polish . . . Prime Minister. . . . Peter assents to ‘Paderewski had no musical talent’. . . . Should we infer

(19) Peter believes that Paderewski had no musical talent

or should we not?

I have one preliminary comment. Kripke presents this puzzle as a puzzle about the beliefs of a certain individual. But from the Fregean perspective, there is no puzzle about Peter’s *beliefs*: Peter stands in the belief relation to a proposition consisting in a way of thinking of Paderewski coupled with the sense of “had musical talent,” and he also stands in the belief relation to a proposition consisting in a *different* way of thinking of Paderewski coupled with the sense of “had no musical talent.” Thus his dossier-object map is

²⁸See “A Puzzle about Belief,” in *Meaning and Use*, ed. A. Margalit (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1979). The quotation below is from p. 265, except that I have altered the numbering.

many-one as regards Paderewski, like Lois's as regards Clark; the novel element of the case is just that Peter's two dossiers are labelled by coreferential homonyms.²⁹

What this gives rise to is not a puzzle about belief but a quandary about belief *ascription*: how should someone who only has one name with a single sense express the facts about Peter's beliefs? One problem is that if we assert both (18) and (19), we make Peter sound foolish, though we know that he does not have contradictory beliefs. The other difficulty is that if we assert both (18) and:

(20) Peter does not believe Paderewski had musical talent,

we seem to involve *ourselves* in a contradiction. On the other hand, aren't (18) and (20) both true?

At first sight, the logophoric analysis does not seem to hold out much promise of illumination here. For it implies that all of (18)–(20) are defective, because the definite descriptions implicit in their meanings are improper. Thus (18) would be analyzed as

(21) Paderewski is such that for Peter's so-labelled α , $B(\text{Peter}, \alpha \wedge \ulcorner \text{had no musical talented} \urcorner)$

but we cannot speak of "Peter's so-labelled way of thinking of Paderewski," since Peter has two such ways of thinking. Granted Russellian truth conditions, then, (18) and (19) are false, and (20) is true so long as the description is within the scope of the negation. Yet these verdicts are quite unnatural. Those who know the story are inclined to say, if tentatively, that (18) and (19) are both true, and to waver over, perhaps eventually to reject, (20). It seems that our attachment to ordinary practice inclines us to ascribe contradictory beliefs where we should not and even to make contradictory ascriptions. And the logophoric analysis simply passes these phenomena by.

However, a more sensitive application of the analysis explains why we would assent to both (18) and (19) and has the added bonus of showing that in doing so we need not be ascribing contra-

²⁹For a recent clear account of this kind of Fregean perspective on Kripke's cases, see W. Taschek's "Would a Fregean be Puzzled by Pierre?" *Mind* 97 (1988), pp. 99–104.

dictory beliefs. Definite descriptions are rarely, if ever, evaluated without any reference to context: a request to take the dog for a walk does not really carry the implication that there is exactly one dog in the universe. Rather, the context and the content of a discourse determine which of the various objects satisfying the restrictive condition in the description is relevant. And one feature of the procedure involved in this is that when the content of what is said together with features of the surrounding circumstances do not completely determine choice of object, we prefer a choice which makes best sense, psychologically, of the speaker, given what we know he knows.³⁰ Suppose, for example, that Peter's situation is known to the ascriber, we know this, and we have to evaluate (18), (19) and (20) without reference to any particular occasion of utterance by Peter (there are many variations of the initial conditions which could be considered, but they can all be dealt with by the method I use for this situation). In evaluating (18), we may then take the description "Peter's so-labelled way of thinking of Paderewski" to determine that way of thinking which is a constituent of a belief of Peter's to the effect that Paderewski had musical talent, since that selection makes (18) express a truth which we know the ascriber knows. This is how the tentative thought that (18) is true arises. Correspondingly, and for parallel reasons, when (19) is asserted, we may take the description "Peter's so-labelled way of thinking of Paderewski" to pick out that different way of thinking which is a constituent of a belief of Peter's to the effect that Paderewski had no musical talent. Since the ways of thinking are different, (18) and (19) do not ascribe contradictory beliefs.³¹ And we waver over (20) because on the one hand we have already asserted its contradictory, while on the other, there is an available

³⁰Here I have been influenced by David Lewis's "Scorekeeping in a Language Game," *The Journal of Philosophical Logic* 8 (1979), pp. 339–359.

³¹It is not unprecedented for attitude ascriptions which clearly seem to impute contradictory beliefs to turn out on a closer look not to do so. Consider "John believes that you are a philosopher" and "John believes that you are not a philosopher" relative to the *same* context (same speaker, same time, same "you"). According to me, the first ascription means the same as "You are someone John believes to be a philosopher" and the second the same as "You are someone John believes not to be a philosopher," and this pair of ascriptions does not impute belief in a contradiction. See "Indexicals and Intensionality," pp. 13–15.

alternative selection of a way of thinking which allows (20) to express a truth which we know is known to the ascriber, rather than a falsehood which we know he knows is false. Someone who does wish to agree to (20) is more influenced by this second consideration, and so is not contradicting himself in also endorsing (18).

If this is a plausible reconstruction of the underlying mechanics of how someone who knows the whole story goes about evaluating the ascriptions, it means that such a person is doing more than just taking Peter's linguistic behavior at face value. Principles for resolving *prima facie* improper sense descriptions are also being employed. Such principles will always play a role in Kripke's cases, where there is either a single name labelling two of the believer's dossiers and only one of the ascriber's, or else there are two names labelling distinct dossiers of the believer, names which have an equally good claim to be a linguistic counterpart of a single name of the ascriber's (cf., "London" and "Londres"). And we have just seen that the effect of such principles is to dispel the air of contradiction that hangs over (18)–(20). But improper descriptions play no role in standard cases: there is a stark contrast between the fact that (18) and (19) need not constitute ascription of contradictory beliefs and the fact that someone who assents to both (1) and "Lois believes Clark Kent can fly" does ascribe contradictory beliefs. This is why I reject Kripke's claim to find a significant theoretical parallel between his cases and standard ones: in his cases, we do not ultimately find any results that suggest there is something wrong with taking the believer's linguistic behavior at face value. So no reason has been given to think that it is this practice which is at the root of the trouble in standard cases when substitution is made.

I said earlier that Kripke's puzzle is really a puzzle about how to *describe* Peter's beliefs. For although we can arrive at definite interpretations of (18)–(20), the procedure involves much uncertainty. However, there is a remedy for this, and the logophoric analysis explains nicely how it works. The core of the problem we face in describing Peter's beliefs is one of the *expressive inadequacy* of the range of senses we can express by our words relative to the range Peter expresses with his. Now the obvious way to overcome an expressive inadequacy in a language is simply to extend the language's expressive resources. And it appears to me that this is exactly what we do in such cases as Peter's, without being guided by

any philosophical theory. There is in English a way of qualifying singular terms which one naturally reaches for in discussing Peter's beliefs: one can qualify a term by attaching "the F" to it, where F is some salient predicate. Kripke does this himself, apparently without attributing any significance to the maneuver, when he writes: "Before [Peter] hears of 'Paderewski-the-statesman', it would appear that . . . [his] dialect can be translated homophonically into our own" ("A Puzzle about Belief," p. 279, n. 37). If we apply this qualification strategy to (18)–(20), replacing occurrences of "Paderewski" with "Paderewski the pianist" and "Paderewski the Prime Minister" so as to make every ascription true, all appearance of contradiction vanishes: Peter believes Paderewski the pianist had musical talent and Paderewski the Prime Minister had no musical talent, and does not believe that Paderewski the Prime Minister had musical talent.

I think it is a pretheoretic datum that by replacing occurrences of "Paderewski" with "Paderewski the pianist" and "Paderewski the Prime Minister" we are in some way *clarifying* our statements about Peter's beliefs. The clarification is like disambiguation in that it settles an interpretation which was previously unsettled. Some examples of standard uses of a phrase "the F" to disambiguate a term are "the emperor Julian," "Santa Claus: the Movie," "the proposition that Clark Kent is Superman," and "the fact that Clark Kent is Superman." In these examples, the function of "the F" is to determine the customary reference of the (ambiguous) following term. But clarification by using "Paderewski the pianist," etc., cannot be construed as disambiguation of customary reference, since Paderewski the pianist *is* Paderewski the Prime Minister. Rather, the use of qualified names leads to replacement in the ascription analyses of improper by proper definite descriptions, such as "Peter's so-labelled way of thinking of Paderewski the pianist." (The qualification works, of course, only on the supposition that the qualifying condition determines just one of the believer's dossiers.)³² The effect of augmenting one's language by adding the two names "Paderewski the pianist" and "Paderewski the Prime Minister" is to adjust the linguistic counterpart relation:

³²If no such condition can be found (see Kripke, "A Puzzle about Belief," p. 260) then perhaps the best we could do in reporting Peter's beliefs is "He believes a Paderewski is F and a Paderewski is not-F."

one of Peter's names "Paderewski" becomes the linguistic counterpart of the ascriber's "Paderewski the pianist" and the other the linguistic counterpart of "Paderewski the Prime Minister." Note that there is no requirement that the conditions "pianist" and "Prime Minister" should actually occur in the labels on Peter's dossiers. Their role is simply to determine which of Peter's labels "Paderewski" shall be the linguistic counterpart of a particular name the ascriber uses. In terms of the functioning of descriptions, what the qualifier does is to eliminate our reliance on our knowledge of what the ascriber knows about Peter in selecting that way of thinking of Peter's which is germane to the evaluation of the ascription. The relevant way of thinking is now fixed by the content of the ascription itself, so that if the ascriber were to say, "Peter believes Paderewski the Prime Minister had musical talent," his statement would be uncontroversially false.

If this is correct, some moves Kripke makes against the Fregean should be resisted. Kripke insists that we answer the question (*ibid.*, p. 259), "Does Peter, or does he not, believe that Paderewski had musical talent?" But if the interpretation of this question is uncertain, then we are under no obligation to answer it. The situation would be comparable to one where someone asks, "Was Aristotle wealthy?" in a context where it is unclear if it is the philosopher or the shipping magnate who is meant. The correct response is to ask which interpretation of the question is intended, and only then to answer it. I suggest that the response should be the same if the question is underspecified in that it leaves the interpreter too much work to do in deciding which way of thinking is relevant: one is entitled to ask the questioner to qualify his uses of the name "Paderewski." Thus it is entirely reasonable to reply to Kripke's question about Peter with: is the question whether Peter believes Paderewski *the pianist*, or Paderewski *the Prime Minister*, had musical talent? That is, there is a case to be made for rejecting the question as Kripke formulates it.

The main moral Kripke urges for his examples is that we should not take "absurd" conclusions such as "Lois has all along believed that Clark Kent is Superman" as evidence that interchange of co-designative names in belief contexts is illegitimate. I have argued in reply that the reasons Kripke gives for thinking that the difficulty lies elsewhere (in "the nature of the realm being entered"—*ibid.*, p. 206) are ineffective: upon a closer look, and against the

background of a realistic account of how descriptions function in natural language as opposed to the logician's abstraction, the belief ascriptions in his examples are seen to be not so problematic. Their worst feature is that they suffer from uncertainty of interpretation, but this can be eliminated by replacing occurrences of "Paderewski" with qualified versions of the name. If we *then* wish to produce effects comparable to the results of substitution in ascriptions of beliefs to Lois, it is precisely substitution that we have to apply. For instance, on the basis of the fact that Paderewski the pianist is Paderewski the Prime Minister, we could infer that Peter believes that Paderewski the Prime Minister had musical talent, though we are already committed to saying that he believes Paderewski the Prime Minister had no musical talent. But without using the identity fact, nothing counterintuitive can be obtained from these belief ascriptions. That is, the only way of generating problems from belief ascriptions made in an expressively adequate language requires substitution on the basis merely of identity of customary reference. The results are "unpalatable" and "absurd," to use Kripke's words; and apart from substitutivity, there is no other principle about propositional attitudes which bids so strongly for the role of culprit.³³

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