Second Paper

1. In "A Conversation with Einstein's Brain," the Tortoise describes a process by which you can use the Einstein-book to carry on a "conversation." Defend the claim that this process doesn't merely create a simulation of an intelligent, thinking being; instead, it generates a intelligent, thinking being, in the way that turning the handle on a hand-cranked record player generates music. You may want to formulate and respond to objections to the view you're defending, like the ones Searle makes against the view that anyone in "The Chinese Room" understands Chinese.
2. In one episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation, the crew discovers that Will Riker had several years before unknowingly been in a teletransporter accident. The result was that a duplicate version of him was left behind on an abandoned planet. They rescue the duplicate, and complications ensue. Neither the current-day Will Riker nor his double has a better claim to be the same person as the "original" Riker. When "fission" accidents like that occur, we can't say that either of the people who step out of the teletransporter are numerically identical to the person who stepped in. Ordinarily, though, the characters on Star Trek seem quite happy to use the teletransporter. So they must think that in the ordinary case, when no accidents occur, the person who will step out of the teletransporter is the same person as them. (Or perhaps they don't really care whether the person who will step out is the same person.

   Would you use a teletransporter? Does it matter how the teletransporter works? If you would use a teletransporter, what would you say to persuade someone who was afraid to use it, because they thought that the person who steps out would be a different person, no matter how qualitatively similar they were? If you wouldn't use a teletransporter, what would you say to persuade someone who thinks we do survive teletransportation, in fact she "remembers" (or at least, seems to remember) using one many times in the past.

3. (a) Suppose someone disguises themself as you and convinces other people he or she is you. While pretending to be you, they make various promises on your behalf. When, later, you learn about these promises, would you think you had an obligation to fulfill them?
   (b) Suppose you yourself make some promises, but then afterwards go partying so hard that you completely lose your memory of the past few days, including making the promises. Later, though, you encounter proof that you did make the promises. Would you think you had an obligation to fulfill them?
   (c) You make some promises. Then you wire yourself up to a device that erases the neural patterns in your brain, and implants new memories and a new personality. The resulting person is Post-You. (We are not specifying whether or not Post-You is the same person as you; you should decide this for yourself.) As in cases (a) and (b), Post-You remembers nothing of the promises; but is later informed that they were made and what happened afterwards. Does Post-You have an obligation to keep the promises? Is this case more like case (a) or like case (b)? Are there morally important differences between these cases? If so, what are they?

Papers are due in your TA's email inbox by 10 PM on Friday May 2. Our policy for late papers is available on the web.

Your papers should be around 1500-2000 words (4-6 double-spaced pages).

As before, read the topics carefully and be sure to answer the specific questions asked. Write as clearly and straightforwardly as possible. Don't use any technical vocabulary without explaining it or giving an illustration of what it means. (You need to explain the technical vocabulary you're using even if it was introduced and explained in class. Philosophers often attach subtly different meanings to their technical words, so it's important that your reader knows precisely what you mean by those words.)

You may profit from going back and re-reading the Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper, on the course web site. There's probably a lot of advice there which you're now in a better position to appreciate.

It should now be clear to you that, to write a good philosophy paper, you must develop a clear plan or outline for how you want your paper to go. And you must write several drafts. We encourage you to come talk to us about your ideas. We also want you to talk to each other, and to show your drafts to each other for feedback.

If you'd prefer to write on a topic other than the ones listed here, then you may do this: Write up the questions that you'd like to answer, in the kind of format used above. Submit them to us for approval by 10 PM on Thursday April 24. If your questions are of reasonable scope, philosophically engage with the materials we've discussed, and look like they'll generate a promising paper, then we'll approve them. If we don't approve them, you'll need to answer one of the topics above, instead.