

Feldman Ch 6: States & Argues Against "Termination Thesis"


Termination Thesis: After dying, you never exist any more.

Opponents (Feldman): Sometimes after dying, you do still exist
↙ (As a dead corpse, which is still you - not as a disembodied soul in heaven etc)

Sometimes can truly say of a dead body/corpse: this used to be a living person.

p. 105: "Good news is that most of us will survive death..."

TERMINATORS say instead:



In later chapters, Feldman will argue against Epicureans who are taking Termination Thesis for granted...

Feldman thinks ordinary speech (sometimes) supports his view

? 'This thing you're dissecting never swam in a pond.'

? That dead object on the road isn't my horse.

✓ Aunt Ethel died last week, and we're burying her tomorrow.

Argument 1 for Termination Thesis

(Lucretius, Descartes)

from dualism

person is combination of body & soul

like bouquet/rearrangement of flowers

At moment of death, the combination is destroyed

Feldman

- I'm not such a dualist

- Should term thesis only be available to such dualists?

- This would only support term thesis about persons, for other objects (clams, cells that die) argument wouldn't work

the person's decaying body - was it ever alive? then term thesis false for it

Argument 2: "Corpses aren't people"

electron e

ceases to be electron -

so no longer exists (even if electron's destruction created some new particle(s))

teenager Tom

ceases to be a teenager -

but still exists (as an adult)

"Adults aren't teenagers"
(table converted into lecture)

person Paula

now a corpse is there,
no person anymore