What kinds of mental states does Davidson’s discussion focus on? Which ones does it ignore?
What are the three principles Davidson thinks seem to conflict? What is his argument that they’re in fact compatible?
How does Davidson understand the claim that an event is physical, or that it is mental? Does he think it’s possible for events to be both? If not, why not? If so, how would that work?
What does Davidson mean when we discusses whether the mental is “anomalous”?
Davidson discusses grue and emeroses to illustrate his idea of predicates being “made for each other.” What does he mean when he says that mental and physical predicates aren’t made for each other?
Why does Davidson think there can’t be strict laws connecting the mental and the physical?
Davidson asserts: “There is no assigning beliefs to a person one by one on the basis of his verbal behavior, his choices, or other local signs no matter how plain and evident.” Why does he think this? What role does it play in his argument?
If there are no laws connecting mental and physical, does Davidson think it follows that the mental can’t supervene on the physical, either? Why or why not?