Philosophy 158 Externalism about the Mind

Asst. Prof James Pryor Dept. of Philosophy

Other Bodies

1. What is a "de re belief"? Suppose that Alfred has a de re belief, of apple 1, that it is wholesome; and then later has a de re belief, of apple 2, that it is wholesome. On Burge's view, would this merely be a difference in the way Alfred's mental states are related to the environment? Or would it be a genuine difference in the content of Alfred's mental states?

2. On Burge's telling of the Twin Earth story, Adam and his twin don't merely differ in their de re beliefs. Adam doesn't merely have a belief of the stuff water, that it's wet, nice to drink, etc. Rather, Adam believes that the stuff water is wet, nice to drink, and so on. Explain the difference.

3. According to Burge, Adam's twin doesn't believe that water is wet. etc., though he has beliefs he'd express with the words "Water is wet." Burge concludes that we can't narrowly individuate ordinary, non-de-re beliefs and thoughts. Precisely how does this differ from the conclusion Putnam drew from his version of the Twin-Earth story?

4. Explain the following passage:

   The fact that the Twin-Earthians apply 'water' to XYZ is not a reflection of a shift in extension of an indexical expression with a fixed linguistic meaning, but of a shift in meaning between one language, and linguistic community, and another. (Other Bodies, p. 105)

   What is it for a term to be indexical? Why does Burge believe that "water" is not an indexical term? Why does he think it is important that we avoid conflating natural-kind words and indexical expressions? How does Burge respond to Putnam's arguments that "words like 'water' have an unnoticed indexical component"?

5. Burge gives 2 arguments in section 3 for believing that Adam's twin does not believe that water is wet, hope that there is water within 20 miles, etc. State these arguments in your own words.

6. Does Burge believe that possessing a belief that water is wet requires there to be, or have been at some time, water in one's environment? Does he believe that possessing this belief requires one to be a member of a linguistic community?