Read pp. 22-110 of Naming & Necessity (read it slowly, and
carefully, and more than once); then go back and read the Preface.
Kripke cites three arguments which are alleged to support the
Frege-Russell view of how ordinary proper names work. (One of these he
calls the "basic problem"; the other two he calls "subsidiary arguments.")
What are these arguments?
Kripke discusses an amendment to the Frege-Russell view of how names
work, according to which names aren't associated with particular
descriptive conditions, but rather with a family or cluster of descriptive
conditions. Explain briefly how this amendment is supposed to work.
What does it mean to say that a name is a "rigid designator"?
What is the difference between the claim that a description "fixes the referent" of a name, and the claim that the description "gives the meaning" of the name?
If a description gives the meaning of a name, is the name a rigid designator, or not? How about if the description merely fixes the referent of the name?
In Kripke's view, could an account of names which said that descriptions merely fix the reference of names draw support from all of the arguments mentioned in question 1, above? Explain why or why not.
What is Kripke's argument that no description (or cluster of
descriptions) gives the meaning of names like "Moses" or "Aristotle"?
Kripke also argues that there are no descriptions which every competent
user of names like "Cicero" or "Gödel" associates with the name, that
suffice to fix the references of those names. Explain briefly why not.
Kripke believes that identity statements between proper names, like
"Cicero" and "Tully" are necessary if true. Does that mean that we have to
be able to know a priori whether or not these identity statements are true?
Why or why not?
Comment on the analogies and disanalogies you see between what Kripke
says about users of a name like "Cicero" and what Putnam says about users
of a general term like "water."
