What is the "central idea" of a solipsistic semantics, according to
LePore & Loewer? How is this related to the doctrine they label
"transparency"?
Kripke gives an account of the semantic properties of names. Kaplan
gives an account of the semantic properties of indexicals. Names and
indexicals are linguistic expressions. What bearing do LePore & Loewer
suggest these accounts have on the nature of thought?
LePore & Loewer suggest three sorts of reasons for thinking that even
if some of our thoughts have "non-solipsistic interpretations," they must
also have "solipsistic interpretations." What are these reasons?
LePore & Loewer entertain the suggestion that Kaplan's notion of
character might enable us to individuate thoughts solipsisticly. The idea
here is that there is a "solipsistic difference" between two thoughts--a
difference in the properties a solipsistic semantics assign them, a
difference that could be recognized without begging any questions about the
existence of the external world--iff the thoughts have a different
character. They argue that this suggestion fails, since some thoughts which
have the same character are, even from a solipsistic point of view, quite
different. Explain the example they offer to illustrate this.
Explain Putnam's notion of a "stereotype." LePore & Loewer
entertain the suggestion that this notion might enable us to individuate
thoughts solipsisticly. The idea here is that there is a solipsistic
difference between two thoughts iff the thoughts have different
stereotypes. What reasons do they offer for rejecting this suggestion?
