Philosophy 257 Behavior and Other Minds

Asst. Prof James Pryor Dept. of Philosophy

Argument from Analogy

1. I have direct knowledge of my own experiences, but I cannot have such knowledge of anybody else's experiences.
2. So the only ground I can have for believing other people have experiences is that their behavior is of certain sorts.
3. First-person and third-person mental talk have the same sort of meaning: what I say about X when I say he's in pain is the same as what I say about myself.
4. What I say about myself is not necessarily equivalent to any claims about how I do or would behave.
5. So, by 3 and 4, what I say about others is not necessarily equivalent to any claims about how they do or would behave.
6. So information about others' behavior can't deductively justify me in believing they have experiences. It can at best inductively justify me.
7. So, by 2 and 6, the only ground I can have for believing other people have experiences is an inductive argument from their behaving the way they do.

Direct Knowledge

In fact, there seem to be important differences between "direct knowledge" and "infallible knowledge." See Notes on Epistemic Authority and Immunities. Perhaps there are interpretations of "direct knowledge" which make premise 1 true and able to support premise 2. But we needn't pursue this.

Objections to the Argument From Analogy

• Any such inductive argument would have to be based on observed correlations between my own experiences and my own behavior, and that would be a very impoverished and biased inductive basis.
• It's sometimes claimed to be a necessary condition for an inductive argument to support belief in the existence of Xs that it be possible to directly observe Xs; however, it's not possible to directly observe others' experiences.
• It's sometimes claimed that if our best justification for believing in others' experiences is merely inductive, then we cannot understand what it would be for others to have experiences. (Malcolm defends this criticism.)