Harvard University, FAS

Philosophy 257

Behavior and Other Minds

 Asst. Prof James Pryor
Dept. of Philosophy

Varieties of Realism and Irrealism

Are the relevant sentences apt for truth and falsity, genuine assertion, and belief?
NO
 YES
Non-cognitivist, Instrumentalist, Expressivist
(Ayer, Blackburn, Gibbard, Dennett)		 Are the sentences intended to be true?
NO YES
Fictionalism
(the sentences are truth-apt but not intended to state literal truths)		 Are the sentences ever true?
NO YES
Error Theory, Projective Error
(Mackie, Field)		 Wright's "Minimal Realism"
Possible Responses:
  • eliminativism
  • revise meanings of original claims
  • revise the force of the original speech-acts (i.e., keep the claims as originally meant, but now regard them as useful fictions)
Further breakdown:
  • irrealist forms of reductionism (phenomenalism, behaviorism)
  • the truths are somehow dependent on the possible evidence we could have for or against them (Dummett)
  • the truths are somehow subjective or response-dependent
  • "robust realism" (might be reductionist: e.g., type-identity theories about mental states)

[Phil 257] [James Pryor] [Philosophy Dept.]

Created by: James Pryor
Last Modified: Mon, Jul 17, 2000 6:58 PM