Questions about Russell reading
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1. Why does Russell think Scott is not a constituent of the proposition we
   express using "the author of Waverly"?

2. What would Russell say about "The present king of France is bald"---true,
   false, neither? is he right?

3. Why does Russell think that ordinary names like "Homer" are not *really*
   names? What *are* really names? Why them?

4. If we all associate different descriptions with "Bismarck," how do we
   manage to communicate?

5. Why does Russell think we can't be acquainted with external objects like
   Bismarck and the table?

6. What does Russell mean by "acquaintance"? By "sense-data"? By "universal"
   or "concept"?

7. Is Russell committing himself to the view that there's nothing more to
   external objects like tables than our sense-data of them?

8. What is Russell's "fundamental epistemological principle"? When defending
   this princple, he says "If we make a judgment about (say) Julius Caesar,
   it is plain that the actual person who was Julius Caesar is not a constituent
   of the judgment." What exactly is Russell denying here? Why does he think
   "it is plain" that that is false? Is it?

9. Russell complains against the view that my judments about Julius Caesar are
   built up out of "ideas" or mental stand-ins for JC. Why? How is his view
   different?

10. What is going on in the discussion of self-consciousness in Knowledge by
    Acquaintance (KA) around p. 110?

11. In KA, around pp. 111-12, Russell considers an argument that we're not
    acquainted with the universal, the relation of being before, but are
    instead only acquainted with facts about some things being before other
    things. Why does Russell think that argument fails?

12. What does this passage mean? "A man's name is what he is called, but
    however much Scott had been called the author of Waverly, that would not
    have made him be the author; it was necessary for him actually to write
    Waverly, which was a fact having nothing to do with names." (KA, p. 123)

13. Why does Russell think that "Scott is Scott" and "Scott is Sir Walter" are
    (on one interpretation) the same "trivial" proposition. Why are they
    different from the proposition that "Scott is the author of Waverly"?