Review Sheet for Final
To prepare for the exam, be sure you know what each of the following mean, and what bearing they have on the issues we discussed in class.
- valid argument, sound argument
- sufficient condition, necessary condition
- a "criterion" or practical test for X vs. a definition or analysis of what we mean by X vs. a stipulative definition of X
- What is a thought-experiment? Why are science fiction examples relevant to philosophy?
- begging the question
- equivocation
- dilemma
- reductio
- realism
- substance vs. property vs. process/activity
- "not every noun names a substance"
- process-based definitions of life vs. ingredient-based definitions
- Feldman's "Jonah objection" to vitalism
- mind vs. soul
- mental state
- dualism vs. materialism/physicalism
- Descartes' Dreaming Argument
- Descartes' Cogito Argument
- the Meditation 2 argument that what I am is a thinking thing (a mind)
- the Meditation 6 argument that my mind is separate from my body
- Leibniz's Law
- "I know that reporter is alive right now. I don't know whether Superman is still alive. Hence that reporter is not Superman."
- "I have no doubts about my own existence. I do have doubts about whether my body really exists. Hence I am not my body."
- examples of using Leibniz's Law to argue for dualism; examples using it to argue against dualism
- the "divisibility" argument for dualism
- necessary facts vs. contingent facts
- epistemic possibility
- metaphysical possibility
- physical possibility, also called nomological possibility
- examples of claims which are necessary but such that someone might be able to conceive or imagine them false
- saying one's fist is not identical to one's hand vs. saying that the fist is separate from, and can exist without, the hand
- examples where the A facts are claimed to settle the B facts; supervenience
- Turing Test: what is it? what is passing it supposed to show?
- behaviorism
- dispositions
- counterfactual claims
- manifestation of a disposition
- categorical basis of a disposition
- inverted color spectrums
- privileged access
- epiphenomenalism
- interactionism
- "the physical world is causally closed"
- causal "overdetermination"; why is it unattractive to say this happens everytime the mental causes a physical effect?
- the "remote control" argument against dualism
- What is a functional state? For instance, what makes something the ZERO state of a Coke machine?
- Causal Theory of Mind, functionalism
- "the mind is the brain" vs. "the mind is the brain's software": what do these slogans mean?
- multiple realizability
- representational states, intentionality
- derivative vs. intrinsic (or "original") intentionality
- Searle's Chinese Room Argument
- the "Systems Reply" to Searle
- numerical identity vs. qualitative identity
- intrinsic properties vs. extrinsic or relational properties
- essential properties vs. accidental properties
- the difference between intrinsic properties and essential properties
- the difference between intrinsic properties and important properties
- relation between Leibniz's Law and qualitative change
- Ship of Theseus
- conventionalism about personal identity
- brain transplant vs. "information transplant"
- teletransportation
- time-slice, person-stage (comparison of stages in a person's life to innings in a baseball game)
- "genuine memory presupposes identity", the circularity objection to Proposal #3
- quasi-memory
- psychological continuity
- direct psychological connections vs chains of psychological connections
- fission, fusion
- what does it mean for a relation to be transitive?
- the "psychological continuity + no competitors" view of personal identity
- "Identity should be an intrinsic matter, that is, intrinsic facts should settle how many people there are. It shouldn't depend on extrinsic facts!"
- the "bodily continuity" view of personal identity
- the "soul theory" of personal identity
- the "epistemic objections" to various proposals about personal identity
- the differences between the materialism/dualism debate and the debate about personal identity
- surviving in the strict philosophical sense vs. surviving in Parfit's sense (that is, having someone around who is psychologically continuous with you)
- "Personal identity isn't what we care about!"
- difference between the process of dying, the event of death, the state of being dead
- the Termination Thesis
- difference between being essentially alive and being immortal
- Epicurus' argument that your own death isn't bad for you
- hedonism
- acting for your own purposes vs acting for selfish purposes
- feeling good because you got what you aimed for vs aiming for feeling good
- intrinsic vs instrumental vs comparative badness
- the Deprivation Account of the badness of death
- Lucretius' argument that it's unreasonable to regard no longer being alive as worse than not yet being alive