Phil 101: Frankfurt Cases

One kind of example we discussed involves a subject — let’s call her Nadya — whose brain some neuroscientist Desmond has wired up, so that if he wants to, he can intervene and take control of what she does, perhaps even how she thinks and chooses. But Desmond is also able to monitor Nadya’s thoughts and decides not to intervene unless he needs to. It might be that she’s going to make the choices he’s hoping for, all on her own. And in fact that’s what happens. Nadya chooses to perform some act X, and then goes ahead and carries it out, all while Desmond merely monitors her, and never does anything to actively manipulate her.

These are called Frankfurt Cases, after the philosopher who first described them 50 years ago. Lemos discusses them in his text on pp. 28-32. (See also his remarks about Martin Luther on p. 27 bottom.)

When we consider Frankfurt cases, many of us have the intuitive assessment that Nadya is still morally accountable for doing X — still deserves praise or blame for it, depending on the kind of act it was. Despite the way Desmond has wired her brain. In the case as described, it was still Nadya herself who was the author of her action, and so she retains responsibility for it.

(It may be that Desmond is also to some extent accountable, since he was going to make Nadya still do X if she tried not to; but our focus here is on Nadya’s accountability, not Desmond’s.)

What do these intuitive assessments show? There’s an important principle that many philosophers accept in these discussions, which says:

Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): An agent who did X did so freely, and is morally accountable for doing X, only if there were other things the agent could have done instead — only if the agent “could have done otherwise.”

Philosophers all across the debate find this principle compelling. But Frankfurt cases like Nadya’s may be counterexamples to it. It seems like Nadya is accountable even though she couldn’t have done otherwise. If she tried — or even started to think about trying — Desmond would have prevented her.

Thus, this is one strategy a Compatibilist might employ. Compatibilists might allow that Determinism stands to all of us the way Desmond stands to Nadya, and takes away any possibility for us to do otherwise than we in fact do. But they could argue that this is still compatible with us being the sources or authors of some of our actions, and that is what’s important for morality. Not having other choices and actions really being open to us.

This is sometimes put as the slogan that’s what important for moral accountability, responsibility, blameworthiness, and so on, is source freedom (being genuinely the author of the action), rather than leeway freedom (having alternative possibilities).